Primist

Iranian’s height variation

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Health, Iran, Personal, Science and Technology

Just read some bits of an article, “Secular Trend of Height Variations in Iranian Population Born between 1940 and 1984” and thought to share few of its figures here.

The trend of height in Iran classified by gender according to some prominent historical events:

:: Click on image to enlarge ::

Spatial distribution of height and its variation over five decades in Iran. (The height percentiles were calculated from those born between 1980-84):

:: Click on image to enlarge ::

I was born in 1983 and am 172cm, spot on!

Unable to delete a page layout or a master page in SharePoint: This item cannot be deleted because it is still referenced by other pages

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Computer Software, Science and Technology, Websites

Today I ran into an error while trying to delete a Master Page on MOSS 2007. I made a mistake by copying few wrong files and creating duplicated Master Pages under ”_catalogs”. I thought I can simply right click on it and delete it, but no, it wasn’t that simple! Even when deactivating and uninstalling a page layouts feature these pages still stay in the “Master Page and Page Layout Gallery”. I tried to delete it manually from the gallery and from designer. This gave me the following error message: 

After a bit of lookup, I realised that this is a confirmed problem by Microsoft. The KB article 926812 proposes to change the properties of the master page to Hidden. This long workaround did not solve my problem!

There was however one workaround that solved the problem very quickly:

1- Create a new sub-folder in the master page gallery.
2- Move the Master Pages to the new folder.
3- Now delete the new folder.
4- The unwanted Master Pages are finally gone from the gallery!

Note: I did the above steps by using SharePoint Designer. It’s also doable in SharePoint itself.

While my problem was specific to master pages; I think the same solution will work with Page Layouts as well.

How to hide or unhide Folder Options

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Computer Software, Science and Technology

If you are not able to access “Folder Options” under your windows explorer menu. This post is for you…
Restoring/Removing the “Folder Options” menu involves modifying the Windows Group Policy editor (gpedit.msc).
Just follow the below listed steps:
1. Go to Start >> Run
Type gpedit.msc and press Enter.

2. In the resulting window, navigate to the folder
User Configuration >> Administrative Templates >> Windows Components >> Windows Explorer.
Look for the key named “Removes the Folder Options menu from the Tools Menu“.
Double-click the key and select Not Configured.
Click OK.

3. To remove the “Folder Options” menu, follow the previous steps and select the Enable option for the “Removes the Folder Options menu from the Tools Menu” key.

ODNI NIC’s recent NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Iran, Middle East, Politics, Science and Technology, USA, United Kingdom, War and Military

The ODNI NIC’s recent NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) has made lots of fuss about Iran’s [peaceful] nuclear programme or what US claims as Iran’s nuclear arms aspirations.

Apparently the Estimate is more than 100 pages and only 9 pages have been declassified. The first five pages are about ODNI, NIC (National Intelligence Council), NIEs, and what the buzzwords mean, also the last page is a table comparing the 2007 estimate with the 2005 assessment; so it all leaves us with 3 pages! I really wonder what has been written in the rest of the Estimate and when the US is going to publish and use it.

There are some questions or suspicions on this NIE, especially with their High, Moderate and Low levels of confidence caveats, which at the end of the day doesn’t let an assumption of ‘nothing to worry about regarding Iran’ form in public’s mind.

Levels of confidence (as described in the Estimate, but highlights are by me):

Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of confidence to our assessments, as follows:

• High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.

• Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

• Low confidence generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.

Key Judgements:

A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program (for the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.); we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.

• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.

• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)

• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.

• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.

B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.

C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.

• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program.

• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.

F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities— rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

Key differences between the key judgments of this estimate on Iran’s nuclear program and the May 2005 assessment (as of the Estimate itself):

As mentioned before the Estimate has left many doubts on its major differences with the 2005 assessment. In other words, a full two years after Iran supposedly called a halt to its nuclear programme; the intelligence community was still as sure as it ever is about anything that Iran was determined to build nuclear weapons. Why then should people believe it when it now with the same high confidence says that Iran had already called a halt to its nuclear-weapons programme in 2003? Same with the intelligence community’s reversal on the effectiveness of international pressure. In 2005, the NIE was highly confident that international pressure had not lessened Iran’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, and yet now, in 2007, the intelligence community is just as confident that international pressure had already done the trick by 2003.

In another angle; despite the UN Security Council Resolutions and all the international pressure US and its western allies have imposed to Iran on its nuclear programme, now it is Iran standing above, on the topper step stubbornly stating they won’t stop their Nuclear programme no matter what and declaring the whole file is already concluded. The truth is that Iran has gained the knowledge and Know How the West was afraid of, sooner or later, US, Europe and others have to admit and appreciate Iran’s peaceful nuclear capabilities and leave the crisis. The least US could do here is to say Iran “did” have a plan to produce nuclear weapons but we succeeded on halting it, so it worth it contending with Iran all these years.

“Boeing 787 Dreamliner” Vs. “Airbus A380″

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Science and Technology, USA

The Airbus vs Boeing competition has been interesting to watch in recent years. With the increasing number of world travellers, and limited airport capacity, there is a need for a very large carrier eg. 500+ seats. But the market can only support one such product. So Airbus stepped up with the A380 superjumbo, which in a typical three-class configuration supports 555 seats (and 853 in single cattle-class configuration). It’s a double-decker 4-engined 10 billion dollar bird.

Boeing went for a more modest successor to the illustrious 747-400, namely the 787 Dreamliner, to debut in 2010. It’s a 2-engined composite-framed liner seating 223, half that of the A380. So it’s gonna use more advanced materials, and wing design, but otherwise not be a radical departure from current models.

At the time, i thought Boeing had the right idea. I thought, I’d rather be a shareholder betting on Boeing, than Airbus. The young mechanical engineer in me thought it would be tremendously exciting to be involved in this ambitious A380 project, but the more experienced software engineer thought, oooo, dunno, a bit risky…

Anyways, now it seems that Airbus is having a hard time, with a two year delay, caused by wiring and weight issues because of its relatively oversized frame. FedEx and now UPS have cancelled their orders for cargo versions of the A380 superjumbo, and Airbus has announced 10,000 job cuts … !!

I wonder what, if any, are the lessons to be learnt from this, for software development projects?

100 Words That All High School Graduates — And Their Parents — Should Know

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Culture, Education, Science and Technology

Why look for complicated solutions?

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Education, Entrepreneurship and Intrapreneurship, Science and Technology

Who could say this answer is wrong?

“Microsoft Surface” hits the running ground

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Computer Hardware, Science and Technology

Microsoft just announced a very cool new multi-touch computing product, called Surface. At first the rumors were this would be an iPhone competitor, but it’s clear now that it’s much larger (30-inch display!) and more of an environmental computer device. Using the product, people can interact with information using touch, natural gestures and physical objects. So no mouse or keyboard is required. From the press release:

“Surface turns an ordinary tabletop into a vibrant, dynamic surface that provides effortless interaction with all forms of digital content through natural gestures, touch and physical objects. Beginning at the end of this year, consumers will be able to interact with Surface in hotels, retail establishments, restaurants and public entertainment venues.”

It’s best seen to be believed, so check out the videos on the Surface website. Here are some screenshots from those videos:

This is the kind of technology Microsoft does best - a hardware/software amalgam, but not requiring the branding and design touches that Apple is so good at. The beauty of Surface is that it will be integrated into the environment (i.e. tables), so it doesn’t need to be a cool accessory for humans (like iPod, Macbook, etc). Microsoft isn’t so good at accessorizing, but it definitely has the technology chops to create impressive hardware/software products like Surface and XBox.

Iran’s bank-note with Nuclear sign

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Accounting and Finance, Iran, Middle East, Politics, Religion and Spirituality, Science and Technology

I thought I won’t have a chance to see the new bank note before I go to Iran. But finally I found a picture of it on the net.

The English side of the note features a symbol representing electrons circling a nucleus superimposed over the map of Iran.

I really liked the note, it seems to be an effective innovative patriotic move in 3 aspects. First: if you see the below picture, you could see the nuclear sign. Second: the Persian text which is somehow climbing up is a quote from the Prophet Mohammad (SA) which runs, “if science exists in the constellation, men from the Persian land will reach it.”

And third: PERSIAN GULF, not the fake term of Arabian Gulf.

Did you know?

Posted by Ali Sanaei under Nature, Science and Technology

When the English settlers landed in Australia, they noticed a strange animal that jumped extremely high and far. They asked the aboriginal people using body language and signs trying to ask them about this animal. They responded with ”Kan Ghu Ru” the English then adopted the word kangaroo. What the aboriginal people were really trying to say was
”we don’t understand you”, ” Kan Ghu Ru”.

A statue in a park with a soldier on a horse with it’s 2 feet in the air means the soldier died in combat.
If the horse has only 1 foot in the air, the soldier died of injuries from combat.
If the horse has all 4 feet on the ground, the soldier died of natural causes.

During historic civil wars, when troops returned without any casualties, a writing was put up so all can see, which read “0 Killed”.
From here we get the expression “O.K.” which means all is good.

Multiplying 111,111,111 x 111,111,111 = 12,345,678,987,654,321

Butterflies taste with their feet .

Mosquitoes have teeth .

Starfish have no brains (so far).

A duck’s quack has no echo, and nobody knows why